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 1 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the role of political culture in the development of Chilean democracy as a 
case study for other third-wave democracies in the Latin American region. The prioritization of 
political stability during the years of democratic transition - seen as essential by the political elite 
to prevent the political polarization that led to the 1973 coup d’etat - resulted in limited social 
reform and the dissatisfaction of the average Chilean with his political parties. Differences in the 
political culture of the political elite and at the mass level resulted in a delegitimization of 
democracy for the average citizen. The Chilean case highlights a growing issue of representation 
in Latin America and a general loss of faith in the democratic project.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
CONTENTS 
 
Chapter One: Introduction         3 
 
Chapter Two: Democratic Theory        7 
 Democratization, Corruption, and Modernization      7 
 Political Culture          13 
 
Chapter Three: Chilean Democratic History       19 
 The Beginning of Order and Stability      19 
 Chilean Democracy: Cessation and Return       23 
 
Chapter Four: Democratic Consolidation After Pinochet             27 
 The Political Significance of The Chicago Boys     28 
 A Political Culture of Order and Stability      34 
 
Chapter Five: The Chilean Crisis of Representation       38 
 The Link between Representation and Participation      38 
 The Penguin Revolution        44 
 
Chapter Six: Conclusion          48 
 
Works Cited            49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Pebre, sopaipillas, asado, a bottle of cabernet sauvignon, and a heated political debate 
are constants on a typical Sunday in Chile. Such debates, which even create divisions within 
families, tend to contain extremist discourses such as, “the armed forces saved Chile from falling 
into a Marxist dictatorship,” or “since the coup d’etat Chile has become selfish and 
individualistic, and purely dominated by corporatist incentives.” Both sides of the story, both 
containing truths and lies, define the most polemic political cleavage in contemporary Chile. 
Although the political right has recognized the atrocities committed by the authors of the 
seventeen-year dictatorship, a prominent portion of the Chilean population is still divided on how 
justifiable are the stories of people such as Gloria Lagos, which typify the cases of the other 
40,017 victims of the Augusto Pinochet years.   
“La Gloria” was a 28-year old woman who was three months pregnant with her fourth 
child when she became a victim of the Chilean military. This mother of three was violently taken 
out of her house on August 26th of 1984 after being denounced to belong to the Movimiento de 
Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR, Revolutionary Left Movement) by her spouse, in an effort to 
save his own life. Lagos’s husband had been brutally tortured and his way out of being 
assassinated by the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA, National Intelligence 
Directorate) was to condemn his own pregnant wife to a death penalty for committing the 
“crime” of politically differing with the dictatorship’s ideology.  
While it is inevitable that the families of the tortured and disappeared have more than one 
reason to remain resented and angry towards the political right, three decades after the transition 
to democracy, contemporary Chilean politics are still discussed and perceived in relation to the 
1973 democratic crisis and the following years of authoritarianism. In this sense, Chile is an 
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exemplar when it comes to the understanding of the present through the study of the past. 
Although there is ample literary discussion on the effects of the institutional authoritarian 
legacies of the Pinochet years and the constraints these imposed on the construction of 
democracy after 1990, the analysis of Chilean democratic consolidation can benefit from a 
discussion on political culture. Even if the Constitution of 1980 has been amended more than 30 
times in an effort to eliminate Pinochet’s political legacy, the attitudes, beliefs, and assumptions 
of Chilean politicians remain constrained by the mindset constructed at the time of the transition 
to democracy.  
The coup d’etat led by Pinochet was a response to the political polarization of the 1970s, 
conditioned by the fear of a rise of the political left by right-wing politicians in a Cold War 
context. The prioritization of social reform through social and political struggle favored by 
Salvador Allende was short-lived, as Pinochet eagerly sought to reinvigorate the Chilean values 
of order and political stability that had been prominent since the times of Diego Portales. 
However, Pinochet employed repressive and coercive means to meet his ends, leading to another 
fear at the time of the democratic transition: the fear to never repeat the stories of Gloria Lagos 
and the rest of the victims. The Chilean transition to democracy was thus instrumental in the 
construction of a political culture which prioritizes social cohesion and political pragmatism, and 
which focuses on democratic stability to the extent of ignoring the building of  democratic 
legitimacy at the mass level. Although stability was successfully achieved at least for the first 15 
years following the transition to democracy, the rise of the Penguin Revolution illustrates the 
emergence of a new Chilean political culture and, with it, the need for institutional and structural 
reform.  
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Methodology 
 
Through an analysis of the Chilean case study, this thesis seeks to explore the pivotal role 
of political culture in the discussion of redemocratization and the consolidation of democracy 
following the transition. The choice on Chile as the case study was inspired in the urgency of the 
discussion of how Latin American democracies are becoming outdated. As democracies in the 
developing world begin resembling the developed, industrialized ones, they start dealing with 
problems inherent in the democratic project, but which they did not have to handle before. In the 
current political context, the average citizen does not feel represented, highlighting the need for 
actualization. Since Chile is considered - along with Uruguay - as the most democratically and 
economically prosperous country in the region, it becomes a crucial example of the need of 
democracies to systematically reinvent themselves in order to achieve the central objective of 
constructing governments by the people and for the people.  
In order to arrive to this conclusion, this study first presents democratic theory. A 
discussion on the relationship between democracy, corruption, and modernization is relevant to 
illustrate how Chile is advancing in all of these areas. Nonetheless, it also suggests that there 
ought to be additional factors affecting democratic quality. A discussion of political culture 
serves to fill in this void, and although this study seeks to highlight the importance of this 
concept, it also recognizes the multivariate nature of human and political interactions and thus 
does not neglect the relative importance of other factors in affecting limitations on the deepening 
of democracy in Chile and other developing countries.  
This study then presents the Chilean case beginning with a discussion of two main 
political leaders in Chilean history, Diego Portales and Augusto Pinochet, and their impact on the 
creation of a culture of political order and stability. Then, the discussion is directed more 
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specifically to the years of the transition and the prioritization of stability over social change. 
Through an analysis of the Chilean paradox of decreasing participatory levels with increasing 
democratization, I arrive to the conclusion that it is primarily caused by the discussed political 
culture of fear of change. A discussion of the Penguin Revolution then illustrates the idea that 
Chile has reached a point in which political culture has begun to deviate from that formed during 
the transition, a transformation that is consequently demanding institutional change.  
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CHAPTER TWO: DEMOCRATIC THEORY 
 
Democracy, Corruption, and Modernization  
 
Beginning in the mid-1970s, the world experienced a surge of democratic rule 
denominated by Samuel Huntington as the ‘third wave of democracy.’ This proliferation of the 
values of freedom, equality, and justice were intensified by the end of the Cold War and the 
consequent fall of Communism. The third wave materialized with the end of dictatorships and 
authoritarian regimes particularly in the less-developed countries, such as those in Latin 
America.  
In the 2000s, however, scholars such as Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, Larry 
Diamond, and Marina Ottaway began discussing the concepts of ‘competitive authoritarian 
regimes,’ ‘illiberal democracies, and ‘semi-authoritarian regimes.’ Despite the transition to what 
resembled democratic administrations, a rise in political corruption threatened democratic 
legitimacy.1 The expectations that had been put on the third wave started to be questioned due to 
the realization that transitions from authoritarian rule did not imminently led to sustainable 
democratic systems.2 In the second decade of the twenty-first century this question remains 
relevant, to the extent that Freedom House established that in 2017 “democracy faced its most 
serious crisis in decades” since some of its “basic tenets [...] came under attack around the 
world.”3 Michael J. Abramowitz, president of said institution, has expressed his disappointment 
with the current global situation and is alarmed by the fact that “young people, who have little 
memory of the long struggles against fascism and communism, may be losing faith and interest 
                                                
1 Alfredo Rehren, “The Crisis of the Democratic State,” in Corruption and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Charles 
H. Blake and Stephen D. Morris (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2017): 46. 
2 Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, “Democratization During the Third Wave,” Annual Review of Political 
Science 19 (2016): 126. 
3 Michael J. Abramowitz, “Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in Crisis,” Freedom House. 
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in the democratic project.”4 This observation by Freedom House is not new, however; reports 
establishing that there has been a ‘pushback against democracy,’ an ‘acceleration in democratic 
erosion,’ and an ‘authoritarian resurgence’ have been prominent at least since 2006.5 Levitsky 
and Way opposingly argue that this “gloomy picture” is inaccurate.6 They describe that “the 
excessive optimism and voluntarism that prevaded analyses of early post-Cold War transitions 
generated unrealistic expectations that, when not realized, gave rise to exaggerated pessimism 
and gloom.”7  
Table 1 depicts good governance and democracy indexes for the world, South America, 
and Chile as measured by three different institutions. Freedom House employs a 0 to 7 point 
scale, with 0 representing a free country and 7, on the other side of the spectrum, a country that it 
is not free. For comparative reasons, the values on Table 1 were standardized in a 10 point scale 
with 10 representing a perfectly democratic country. Freedom House’s scores were averaged and 
reversed to fit this scale. Polity IV, on the other hand, obtains its estimates considering a greater 
number of factors, including the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and 
competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. The Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) project started operating in 1996, which accounts for the missing 
data for the years 1973-1995 in Table 1. WGI considers factors such as voice and accountability, 
political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of 
law, and the control of corruption to quantify a country’s level of democracy. As it can be 
observed in Figure 1, global levels of democracy have not followed the same pattern according 
to each institution. While Freedom House believes democracy is in decline - even if the rate of 
                                                
4 Ibid. 
5 Steven Levitsky and Luncan Way, “The Myth of Democratic Recession,” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 1 (2015): 
45. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid.  
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decline is minimal - according to the WGI project democracy levels have remained stable and 
Polity IV believes global levels of democracy are still increasing although at a slower rate than 
that observed in the decade between 1985 and 1995. Despite these variances, the democratic 
scores attributed to Chile by the three institutions indicate that democratic consolidation has been 
on the rise, even outnumbering its Latin American counterparts and being further ahead on the 
democratic spectrum than the world average.  
 
Table 1: Democracy Scores for the World, South America, and Chile from 1973-present8 
 
 1973 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995/6 2000 2005 2010 2015 2017 
World  
Freedom House 3.7 3.6 3.9 3.9 4.6 4.9 5.0 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.1 
Polity IV 2.7 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.9 4.7 4.9 5.3 5.5 5.8 5.8 
WGI - - - - - 3.6 3.6 3.5 4.2 3.6 3.6 
South America  
Freedom House 4.9 4.1 4.1 5.4 5.9 5.9 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.3 5.7 
Polity IV 2.9 2.8 3.0 5.4 6.8 7.3 7.5 7.6 7.2 7.8 7.8 
WGI - - - - - 4.7 4.7 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.5 
Chile  
Freedom House 7.9 1.4 2.1 2.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 
Polity IV 6 0 0 0 8 8 9 9 10 10 10 
WGI - - - - - 8.3 8.3 8.6 8.5 8.1 8.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
8 Constructed by the author, based on data from Freedom House, Polity IV, and WGI. 
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Figure 1: Global Democratic Levels 1973-present9 
 
 
Nevertheless, the scoring differences between Freedom House, Polity IV, and WGI do matter in 
regards to the issue of defining what a democracy entails. According to Juan J. Linz and Alfred 
Stepan, a complete transition to democratic rule occurs when in a given state, there is “sufficient 
agreement” regarding “political procedures to produce an elected government,” when a 
government comes to power as a “result of a free and popular vote, when this government de 
facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial 
power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de 
jure.”10 After the transition to a democratic system occurs, the consolidation of democracy 
“combines behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional dimensions.”11 In other words, this means 
that in a given country, no actor is involved in the expenditure of significant resources in an 
attempt to achieve individual objectives, “a strong majority of public opinion holds the belief 
                                                
9 Constructed by the author, based on data from Freedom House, Polity IV, and WGI.  
10 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South 
America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 3.  
11 Ibid, 5.  
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that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern,” and 
“governmental and nongovernmental forces alike [...] become subjected to, and habituated to, the 
resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new 
democratic process.”12 While elections and institutions matter, there are still other factors 
affecting democratic consolidation such as civil society and public opinion.  
The current lack of consensus on the rise of global democratic levels diverts the focus 
from explaining how transitions to democracy occur to “whether the new regimes really cross a 
democratic threshold and prove durable.”13 When applying Linz and Stepan’s definition of a 
consolidated democracy, the main issue in the developing countries is the behavioral aspect of 
this process, as operationalized with measures of corruption. Corruption has been associated with 
a country’s failure to provide ‘good governance’ and the consequent disappointment of citizens 
with democratic practices. As acknowledged by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, the Control of 
Corruption (CoC) indicator of the WGI project portrays a positive relationship between 
aggregate democratic scores for a given country and its control of corruption. Conversely, this 
results in a negative correlation between levels of democracy and corruption, with the latter 
decreasing as the former increases. In fact, Alfredo Rehren has defined corruption in a 
democracy as “corruption of democracy” due to the exclusionary logic of corrupt practices; 
“those who benefit from corrupt actions, decisions, or exchanges do so by excluding those who, 
under democratic norms, have a claim to inclusion.”14 While at the beginning of the third wave 
democratic failure was synonymous to military intervention, the decline in the number of coup 
d’etats in the post-Cold War led to the redefinition of this concept.15 In the contemporary world 
                                                
12 Ibid, 6. 
13 Haggard and Kaufman, “Democratization During the Third Wave,” 126. 
14 Rehren, “The Crisis of the Democratic State,” 55. 
15 Haggard and Kaufman, “Democratization During the Third Wave,” 132. 
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order, democratic failure occurs through backsliding; that is, “efforts by incumbents to exploit 
state resources to remain in power, by stacking the electoral deck, reducing horizontal checks, 
distributing rents, and attacking and undermining loyal oppositions.”16 It is critical to 
acknowledge that when a society is defined as ‘corrupt’ this implies the systematic practice of 
the abuse of public office for private gains, “not just a sum of individual corrupt acts.”17  
In Latin America in general, the prominence of elitist democracies, the significant degree 
to which power is concentrated in the executive, and decreasing levels of political participation 
“contribute to low degrees of horizontal and vertical accountability and create the conditions for 
the expansion of corruption.”18 In addition to these institutional factors, Mungiu-Pippidi 
advocates for the claim that a society’s political culture matters. Collectivist and status-based 
societies are reigned by particularist principles which also deepens the degree to which 
corruption is institutionalized in these societies.19 In general terms, “the least corrupt countries in 
the world are the oldest democracies.”20 For Mungiu-Pippidi this means that democracy - in 
contrast to Abramowitz - “has been a tremendous success.”21 The problem, she argues, is the 
reduction of patrimonialism affecting the new democracies in the developing world. 
The degree of modernization of a given society appears to additionally play a role in the 
development of a democratic system and thus the reduction of corruption levels. This inverse 
relationship between corruption and modernization has been attributed to reductions in 
government regulations, tax cuts, enhanced competition, and the elimination of rent-seeking 
                                                
16 Ibid. 
17 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, “Introduction: Identifying and explaining governance virtuous circles,” in Transitions to 
Good Governance: Creating Virtuous Circles of Anti-Corruption eds. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Michael Johnston 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017), 3. 
18 Rehren, “The Crisis of the Democratic State,” 55. 
19 Mungiu-Pippidi, “Introduction: Identifying and explaining governance virtuous circles,” 7. 
20 Ibid, 3.  
21 Ibid.  
 13 
opportunities that are intrinsic to economic liberalization. This theory would then assume “that 
democracies are much more likely to fail in the poor countries that transitioned during the second 
half of the Third Wave.”22 Yet, countries such as Mongolia, El Salvador, Ghana, and the 
Dominican Republic were able to sustain democratic rule for considerable periods without 
precedent economic modernization. Even if these democracies are considered democracies in the 
narrow definition of the concept (i.e., primarily relying on vertical accountability), this suggests 
that “even the most basic structural impediments such as the level of development may only have 
conditional effects.”23  
 
Political Culture  
 
Only preceded by Uruguay, Chile is the second least corrupt country in South America, 
as depicted in Table 2. Chile has additionally enjoyed astounding levels of economic growth, 
particularly during the first half of the twenty-first century (see Figure 2). Yet, Chilean 
democracy has been struggling due to a crisis of representation which has reached unprecedented 
levels in the past 2017 elections, suggesting that there are other factors that need to be taken into 
consideration when analyzing the quality of Chilean democracy. Here it is important to highlight 
that by no means does this study seek to establish any sort of belief in cultural determinism, but 
to argue in favor of political culture as a key factor affecting democratic consolidation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
22 Haggard and Kaufman, “Democratization During the Third Wave,” 129. 
23 Haggard and Kaufman, “Democratization During the Third Wave,” 130. 
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Table 2: Corruption Levels in South America24 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Argentina 109 106 105 100 102 106 107 107 95 85 
Bolivia 102 120 110 118 105 106 103 99 113 112 
Brazil 80 75 69 73 69 72 69 76 79 96 
Chile 23 25 21 22 20 22 21 23 24 26 
Colombia 70 75 78 80 94 94 94 83 90 96 
Ecuador 151 146 127 120 118 102 110 107 120 117 
Guyana 126 126 116 134 133 136 124 119 108 91 
Paraguay 138 154 146 154 150 150 150 130 123 135 
Peru 72 75 78 80 83 83 85 88 101 96 
Suriname 72 75 -- 100 88 94 100 88 64 77 
Uruguay 23 25 24 25 20 19 21 21 21 23 
Venezuela 158 162 164 172 165 160 161 158 166 169 
 
 
The concept of political culture emerged in the 1960s and re-emerged in the 1990s with 
discussions on its conceptual importance led by scholars such as Diamond. In his book Political 
Culture and Diplomacy in Developing Countries, Diamond advances the claim that political 
culture has a crucial role to play in the quest for renewal and improvement in the quality of a 
country’s democracy.25 Based on the definition of political culture as “a people’s predominant 
beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about the political system of its 
country, and the role of the self in that system,” Diamond acknowledges that political culture is 
affected by the historical past.26 Yet, this does not mean that this concept is static; “historical 
legacies and traditions visibly resonate in contemporary beliefs and values, but they coexist with 
other, more recent, influences.”27 In an effort to put this idea in simpler terms, Diamond depicts 
                                                
24 Constructed by author, based on data from Trading Economics Analytics. 
25 Larry Diamond, Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
Inc., 1993).  
26 Ibid, 7. 
27 Ibid, 411. 
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political culture as a “geological structure with sedimentary deposits from many historical ages 
and events.”28  
When analyzing the role of political culture in transitions from authoritarianism to 
democracy as conceived by Linz and Stepan (refer to previous section), Diamond acknowledges 
that twentieth century discussion on the issue placed extensive attention on the value of political 
flexibility and instrumentalism to the extent that theorists such as Gabriel Almond, Sidney 
Verba, Seymour Martin Lipset, Robert Dahl, and Alex Inkeles identified the values of 
moderation, cooperation, bargaining, and accommodation as necessary for the maintenance of 
democracy.29 “These elements of political culture were necessary, they argued, to cope with one 
of the central dilemmas of democracy: to balance cleavage and conflict with the need for 
consensus,”30 with the effect of depoliticizing social life and preventing political polarization.  
The case-study of Chile, however, portrays that - in agreement with Diamond’s perspective - this 
early discussion on the concept of political culture suffered from three defects: 
  
1. A neglect of mass culture 
2. A heavy focus on behavior per se, jeopardizing the discussion on the complex 
process by which behavior comes rooted in enduring values 
3. An overlook on other elements of political culture - relevant mainly at the mass 
level - that have been theorized as important for maintaining democracy31 
 
Regarding these three points, it is crucial to acknowledge the existence of different sub-
cultures within a given state. Despite the political elites’ more robust influence in the creation of 
the dominant political culture, Diamond recognizes that within countries, elements such as 
politically relevant beliefs, values, and attitudes are “shaped by life experiences, education, and 
                                                
28 Ibid, 412. 
29 Ibid, 4.  
30 Ibid, 10. 
31 Ibid, 7. 
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social class.”32 At the mass level, stable democracy also requires a belief in the legitimacy of 
democracy. In agreement with Diamond’s recognition that “one factor that would seem to 
enhance the legitimacy of democracy among citizens is direct experience with it,” participation is 
a pertinent way of measure democratic legitimacy. Behind the action of participating in a 
democratic system lies the “sense of competence on the part of citizens that their political action 
may actually produce a change in policy or redress of grievances.”33 In a responsive democratic 
system, social trust and the improvement of the vertical ties between elites and the masses has 
the same pragmatic effect as moderation, cooperation, bargaining, and accomodation. Even if 
Chile is far from facing the political crises of contemporary Venezuela, Fernando de la Rúa’s 
Argentina, Jamil Mahuad’s Ecuador, or even its own democratic collapse in 1973, the current 
crisis of representation suggests that Diamond’s discussion on political culture remains relevant 
today. As Diamond acknowledges in his concluding remarks, “one of the most common sources 
of democratic crisis, decay, and destruction is the rigidity of democratic arrangements that have 
outlived their usefulness, excluding important new social groups and precluding democratic 
efficacy and responsiveness.”34 
In relation to previous discussion on Mungiu-Pippidi’s recognition that the least corrupt 
societies are the oldest democracies - which she identifies as a sign of democracy’s success - it is 
useful to acknowledge that aside from higher degrees of modernization, these Western countries 
also went through the emergence of a renewed political culture. This “New Political Culture” 
(NPC), a concept coined by Terry Nichols Clark and Ronald Inglehart, has seven defining 
                                                
32 Ibid, 1.  
33 Ibid, 14. 
34 Ibid, 431. 
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elements that differentiate it from the general political culture in the developing world.35 Here it 
is important to highlight that by no means does this analysis attempt to establish a hypothesis of 
linear democratization, but it does recognize differing degrees of democratization through the 
dynamism and advancement of political culture. As identified by Clark and Inglehart, these 
seven characteristics are:  
 
1. Transformation of the left-right dimension: left increasingly means social issues, 
less often traditional class politics issues. Increasing the role of government is no 
longer automatically equated with progress, even on the left; and the most 
intensely disputed issues no longer deal with ownership and control of the means 
of production. 
 
2. Social and fiscal/economic issues are explicitly distinguished: “social issues” are 
no longer defined as expensive welfare state programs. Rather, there is a higher 
focus on issues like tolerance for new women’s roles or multiculturalism.  
 
3. Social issues have risen in salience relative to fiscal/economic issues: this change 
is driven by affluence; as wealth increases, people grow more concerned with 
lifestyle and other amenity issues - in addition to classic economic concerns.  
 
4. Market individualism and social individualism grow: the NPC joins ‘market 
liberalism’ (in the past narrowly identified with parties on the right), with ‘social 
progressiveness’ (previously identified with parties on the left).  
 
5. Questioning the welfare state: although not seeking to reduce services, NPCs 
question specifics of service delivery and seek to improve efficiency. But they are 
clearly distinct from the traditional right (e.g., Reagan, Thatcher) that focuses on 
simply cutting government. This leads to efforts to develop smaller, more 
responsive governments, and new intergovernmental agreements. 
 
6. The rise of issue politics and broader citizen participation: these movements 
encourage governments to respond more directly to interested constituents. By 
contrast, traditional hierarchical parties, government agencies, and unions are seen 
as antiquated. 
                                                
35 Terry Nichols Clark and Ronald Inglehart, “The New Political Culture: Changing Dynamics of Support for the 
Welfare State and Other Policies in Postindustrial Societies,” in The New Political Culture, eds. Terry Nichols 
Clark, Vincent Hoffman-Martinot, and Mark Gromala (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998). 
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7. The NPC views are more pervasive among younger, more educated and affluent 
individuals and societies.36 
 
The situation in Chile shows that perhaps this discussion on NPC which emerged in the mid-20th 
century for the older democracies may be relevant in the developing world today. In order for the 
new democracies to adapt to such political culture transformation, institutional and structural 
change is required.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
36 Ibid, 11-13. 
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CHAPTER THREE: CHILEAN DEMOCRATIC HISTORY  
 
In agreement with Diamond’s metaphor of political culture as a “geological structure 
with sedimentary deposits from many historical ages and events,”37 it is first critical to consider 
how two main figures in Chilean history, Diego Portales and Augusto Pinochet, were 
instrumental in the creation of a culture of order and stability. Yet, it is also important to 
acknowledge the first wave of democratic consolidation in Chile, culminating in the 1925 
Constitution, to understand the resilience of the values of liberty, equality, and justice in the 
country.  
 
The Beginning of Order and Stability  
 
“If my father turned revolutionary, I’d have my own father shot.” 
Diego Portales 
 
One of the pivotal factors to determine Chile’s successful transition to democracy in 1990 
is its history of political stability during the period in which democratic rule was first 
consolidated in the country. This stability that has been valued by Chilean politicians since the 
time of independence is even more apparent when Chile is analyzed in comparative perspective 
to its Latin American counterparts. Although it would not be correct to disregard the role played 
by Chilean politicians in the construction of this Chilean exceptionalism, there are several unique 
characteristics of colonial Chile that were instrumental in determining its governmental mode as 
a republic. For imperial Spain, the colonies with the most economic value were the countries that 
are today known as México, Perú, Bolivia, and Guatemala. Chile, just like Argentina, Uruguay, 
and Costa Rica, had relatively less importance for the crown which placed a higher value in areas 
with a greater concentration of people and resources. The way Spain related to Chile meant that 
                                                
37 Diamond, Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries, 412. 
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“the country never attracted the kind of gold-diggers that flooded other Spanish colonies in the 
region.”38 And, this translated into the formation of a particular political culture in which scarcity 
and sobriety were the norm among government officials, establishing “a precedent that survived 
after independence was achieved.”39 
In addition to the emergence of this collected political culture, Chile’s geography was a 
key contributor to political, economic, and social cohesiveness. At the time of independence, 
“Chile was a compact, manageable land, with no more than 700 miles separating the northern 
limit of settlement from the Araucarian Frontier along the Bío Bío.”40 Since a considerable 
portion of this area is desertic and because of the socio-political effects of the organization of 
Spanish colonies into viceroyalties, most of the population was kept concentrated in the northern 
Central Valley, particularly in Santiago. In contrast to other Latin American countries such as 
Perú, Ecuador, or Bolivia, Chile also maintained a relatively homogeneous population, avoiding 
great socio-political struggles regarding any type of ethnic or cultural resentment. National unity 
translated into “elite consensus on fundamental and social institutions even when philosophical 
disagreements or the clash of personalistic factions led to political conflicts.”41 And, in turn, this 
elite had a different composition vis-à-vis the rest of Latin America. Due to Chile’s growing 
economic relations with Anglo-Saxon traders, there was a greater influx of ideas of 
constitutionalism inspired by British and American thought rather than from continental, 
Catholic Europe.”42 Adding on to Chile’s sober political culture, this Anglo-Saxon elite - which 
                                                
38 Patricio Navia, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Maira Martini, “Chapter 9: Chile: human agency against the oods,” in 
Transitions to Good Governance: Creating Virtuous Circles of Anti-Corruption, eds. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and 
Michael Johnston (Cheltenham: Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017), 215.  
39  Ibid.  
40 Simon Collier and William F. Sater, A History of Chile 1808-1994 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 51. 
41 Brian Loveman, Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 139. 
42 Navia, Mungiu-Pippidi and Martini, “Chile: human agency against the odds,” 215. 
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was less worried in personal enrichment than Spanish creoles - aided the formation of a Chilean 
upper class comprised of men who “saw themselves as stakeholders rather than office holders.”43 
Consequently - and unlike most countries in Latin America - Chile did not develop a caudillo 
tradition.  
The first two decades after independence were marked by civil war, the reimposition of 
Spanish authority, the dictatorship of Bernardo O’Higgins, and “a chaotic succession of 
governments proclaiming liberalism, federalism, and republicanism.”44 The year 1830 marked 
the emergence of Portales as Minister of the Interior; a politician resembling the culture of the 
business-driven Chilean elite. Portales led a conservative coalition comprised of business, the 
clergy, and the landowner class and installed an autocratic republic - as it has been commonly 
denominated within Chilean political and historical discussion - which “reconsolidated the 
Hispanic ideal of a strong, centralized executive who imposed order through decrees and the 
necessary coercion to ensure their implementation.”45 His actions and political objectives reflect 
the way in which Portales valued public order above anything else. In fact, “in a moment of 
selfless exaltation, [he] exclaimed ‘If my father turned revolutionary, I’d have my own father 
shot.”46 As he consolidated his position in power, Portales was an influential force behind the 
1833 constitution, which ruled the country for almost a century until replaced in 1925.47 This 
first constitution strengthened the centralist government and, in turn, the hegemony of Santiago. 
It was pragmatic in the way that it guaranteed political stability, putting an end to the chaotic 
politics that characterize the post-independence years. Ironically, however, the stability that the 
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1833 constitution and Portales brought about was achieved through coercive means and “the 
institutionalization of modes of political repression that became routine Chilean practices: 
concession of emergency powers to the presidents; periodic declaration of states of siege and 
suspension of civil liberties and rights; subjecting civilians to courts-martial, military law, and 
summary execution; preventive detention, physical abuse, and exile of political opponents; and 
censorship and closing of the opposition press.”48 At the same time, there was a systematic 
granting of amnesties for repetitive conflicts “that almost emulated the parlamentos and paces 
between Spaniards and Mapuches under the colonial regime.”49In other words, Chile’s 
exceptionalism was achieved through the sacrificing of certain political liberties.  
The tables turned in 1830 and Chile not only started to be distinguished from the rest of 
Latin America due to its stability but also because of remarkable constitutional continuity. 
Political stability was perpetuated until the last decade of the 19th century with rapid economic 
growth that stemmed from Chile’s victory in the War of the Pacific. The Treaty of Ancón and 
Treaty of Valparaíso “resulted in a territorial loss for Perú and a larger and more significant loss 
for Bolivia that left it landlocked.”50 These territories incorporated by Chile were rich in nitrates, 
and “as occurred with export booms throughout Latin America in the late nineteenth century - 
whether they were based upon coffee, sugar, wheat minerals, or other primary commodities - 
exploitation of the nitrate fields would provide Chile with extensive export revenues which 
financed public works and modernization without coming to terms with the internal 
contradictions of the economy or the structural inequalities of Chilean society.”51 Until the civil 
war of 1891 stability depended “upon restricted suffrage, low levels of political participation, 
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and maintenance of government positions in the hands of a small, intermarried, social, and 
economic oligarchy.”52 The 1891 civil war resulted in the emergence of the parliamentary 
republic, weakening the presidency but not the central state. This governmental mode lasted until 
the establishment of the 1925 constitution under Arturo Alessandri, marking the beginning of 
Chilean democratic consolidation.  
 
Chilean Democracy: Cessation and Return  
 
“Sometimes democracy must be bathed in blood.” 
Augusto Pinochet 
 
Although the 1925 constitution did not bring about a complete return to presidentialism at 
first, it did shift the balance back toward the executive. While presidential power was enhanced, 
the role of political parties was not affected or diminished in any way. In fact, “this role was if 
anything strengthened in the years that followed.”53 As it is characteristic of many important 
political changes, the 1925 constitution also resulted in a period of political instability at first. 
But, since the year 1932 until the coup d’etat in 1973, “Chile was the only Latin American 
nation in which competitive party politics, uninterrupted by coups, assassinations or revolutions, 
determined the occupants of the presidency, Congress, and higher policymaking positions in the 
national bureaucracy.”54 In fact, this period is characterized by the widening of the democratic 
tradition. Through processes that lie beyond the scope of this study, in the 1930s Chilean politics 
became increasingly popularized, and “the parties themselves increasingly conducted their 
rivalries within a framework of mass politics.”55 
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This popularization of Chilean politics and the development of political parties also 
resulted in political polarization within Chile, culminating in the coup of 1973. In this year, while 
Allende was completing his third year as the president of Chile, a military junta led by General 
Pinochet established that it had a moral, intellectual and socio-political duty to overthrow a 
government that had caused misery, hatred, and violence for the previous three years.56 Pinochet 
“described the coup as guided by the ‘hand of God,’ and pledged himself to the ‘heroic struggle’ 
to ‘extirpate the root of evil from Chile.’”57 The bombing of La Moneda symbolized the rupture 
of 150 years of democracy that had prevailed in Chile since its independence from Spain, more 
than a century of stable democracy that made Chile the exception to the rule in Latin America, 
where countries were regularly rocked by coups and revolutions.  
The political polarization leading to the 1973 coup attained intensity during the first half 
of the twentieth century. By 1950 and increasingly thereafter, politicians on the left and the right 
received about an equal amount of support from the middle class.58 Those leaning to the left had 
been inspired by the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and therefore pushed for more radical social 
reforms, constructing a fundamental support base for Allende’s victory in the elections of 1970. 
The efforts of the Socialist Party (PS) to create the Chilean road to Socialism were indisputable 
since the start of Allende’s term; free milk was offered to every child, there was a significant 
increase of the minimum wage, landless peasants obtained estates through radical land reform, 
and there was an outset of initiatives to nationalize the copper industry. Even if these policies 
seemed revolutionary, the extreme left kept on pushing for further reform. Those leaning to the 
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right were terrified of an upsurge of Communism in the Southern Cone. In the midst of the Cold 
War, the political right and corporations had the support of the United States (US), which spent 
at least 6.5 million dollars in efforts to oust Allende since the day of his inauguration.59 This 
number was in addition to the money that had already been destined to strengthen the 
opposition’s campaign during the presidential race. In addition to the slowdown in the economy 
caused by Allende’s socio-political policies, the political right was further angered when in 1972 
Allende declared that he was the president of the Popular Unity (UP) (i.e., the left-wing political 
alliance at the time), and not the president of all Chileans.60 Clearly, unlike at least the century 
after independence, stability was not a priority for the socialist president, but reform through 
social and political struggle. He did not consider, however, that he had won the 1970 election 
with only a 36 percent of the votes. This was possible due to the electoral system that prevailed 
before the 1980 Constitution which established - in simplistic terms - that in the case that none of 
the candidates obtained an absolute majority, then Congress would elect a candidate between 
those who had the most votes in the first round. Allende’s choice to govern uniquely under the 
values of his political party produced the alienation and dissatisfaction of a prominent portion of 
the population, eventually creating a political split uniting the right and the Christian Democratic 
Party (PDC) against the UP.  
After General Carlos Prats’s resignation as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, 
Allende appointed Pinochet to this position in recognition of his loyalty during the 1973 
tanquetazo; a failed first attempt at a coup d’etat against the UP.61 This first initiative to oust 
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Allende led his party to prepare to what they denominated a corporatist and fascist offensive.62 
Carlos Altamirano, the secretary of the PS in 1973 recognizes now that the great mistake of the 
PS was making the public believe that there was a real guerrilla movement capable of 
confronting the armed forces.63 Pinochet decided four days prior to the defining coup to join the 
efforts of Admiral José Toribio Medino. On September 11, 1973, the armed forces first occupied 
Valparaíso early in the morning, then proceeded to bombard La Moneda at 11:55 a.m., where 
Allende remained for the rest of the attack refusing to succumb to Pinochet’s army. At 5:10 p.m. 
the remainings of the deceased president were taken out of the presidential palace and seventeen 
years of violent dictatorial rule commenced.  
Three decades ago, however, 55 percent of the Chilean electorate chose to put an end to 
the seventeen-year dictatorship headed by General Pinochet. Even after a decade of center-left 
Concertación governments and the current Bachelet-Piñera series, the 1973 coup d’etat remains 
integral in Chilean politics. It is estimated now that the dictatorship left at least 40,000 victims, 
including those killed, tortured, imprisoned, and exiled.64 But, although the vast majority of 
Chileans acknowledge the gross human rights violations that took place under the dictator, this 
defining moment is still a source of political polarization in the country. Just as the main legacy 
of Chile’s democratic failure in 1973 is the lesson that exclusionary democracy cannot be 
sustained in the long-run, the Chilean transition to democracy also serves as an archetype for 
other transitions, especially when seen in comparative perspective to the other South American 
states.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION AFTER PINOCHET 
 
In 1989 the dictatorial government favored the call for democratic elections to start the 
transition the following year. Ironically, “the procedures for voting [...] were very democratic, 
with many protections against fraud.”65 The regime was careful to establish a fair voting process 
in an effort to legitimize the system established under the 1980 Constitution, regardless of the 
outcome of the plebiscite.66 On October 5th, 97 percent of the electorate - or 90 percent of the 
population at the time - expressed their vote.67 The ballot called for a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ choice on the 
following proposition: 
 
In the face of the international aggression unleashed against the government of the 
fatherland, I support the President Pinochet in his defense of the dignity of Chile, and I 
reaffirm the legitimate right of the republic to conduct the process of institutionalization 
in a manner benefiting its sovereignty.68 
 
The ‘No’ won with 55 percent of the votes, and Pinochet transferred his power to Concertación 
candidate Patricio Aylwin. Although the dictator stepped down from office, he remained as the 
commander-in-chief of the army until 1998 and in 1999 assumed his position as senator for 
life.69 
What occurred in 1990 was not a transition, but a transaction. The 1990 Chilean 
democratic shift epitomizes Stepan’s idea of a “party pact.”70 In conjunction with Linz, Stepan 
explains that transitions from authoritarianism to democratic states are generally “initiated by an 
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uprising of civil society, by the sudden collapse of the nondemocratic regime, by an armed 
revolution, or by a non-hierarchically led military coup.”71 After such defining point, an interim 
government is established which may either decide to schedule elections or that overthrowing the 
government gives it legitimacy to make fundamental changes that it defines as preconditions to 
democratic elections.72 The Chilean case, however, does not fit this ‘typical’ scenario, as it 
represents an agreement between the Concertación coalition with business, Chilean political 
elites, international financial institutions, and foreign trading partners. The atmosphere in 1990 
was one of vigorous yearning to eclipse a hurtful past, to leave the years of the dictatorship 
behind. The mainstream belief in the political realm was that there was a price to pay for stability 
and that the Concertación had to compromise in order to obtain the support of corporations and 
the political right.73 Allowing the military junta to set the terms of the transition - or transaction - 
meant that there was an “anti-democratic bias built into the process of political and institutional 
reform,”74 which directly affected the Chilean democratic consolidation. At the same time, this 
meant that the favoring of the values of moderation, cooperation, bargaining, and 
accommodation (as discussed by Almond, Verba, Lipset, Dahl, and Inkeles) was indeed 
necessary to initiate the second wave of democratic consolidation in Chile.  
 
The Political Significance of The Chicago Boys 
 
In his quest to eliminate Marxist thought, Pinochet installed neoliberalism as the reigning 
economic ideology in Chile. Milton Friedman, working in conjunction with thirteen Chilean 
professors who had obtained their PhDs in the United States - twelve of them in the University of 
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Chicago and one of them in Northwestern University - talked to Pinochet about the great 
potential they saw in Chile to launch the neoliberal project.75 This experiment established the 
structural adjustments that were later denominated the Washington Consensus and enveloped 
reforms such as the privatization of the healthcare and educational systems. At the time of the 
transition and increasingly thereafter, the neoliberal economic system “receded from public 
discourse as an issue of debate.”76 Those that had mobilized against neoliberalism in the 1970s 
had now come “to accept the free market, foreign investment, and international trade.”77 And, 
although those belonging to the PS still operated under that party name, “their embrace of 
neoliberal economics gave the party a new economic and political ideology.”78 
After the transition to democracy, political entrepreneurs continued with the discourse of 
‘modernization’ that was prevalent under Pinochet; a discourse that was used to mask “an 
exaggerated fear of political conflict, stemming from a political legacy that continues to haunt 
protagonists of the Chilean left.”79 This meant that the way in which democracy had been framed 
at the time of the plebiscite changed; while democracy had been presented as the opposite of 
dictatorship, “strong continuities in economic policies persisted between the two regimes.”80 Yet, 
it would not be correct to say that neoliberalism remained in its orthodox form, but it was 
adapted to fit a new political environment. The period from 1973 to 1982 was marked by Chile’s 
orthodox implementation of neoliberalist theory under the Plan de Modernizaciones 
(Modernization Plan). This meant that “the financial sector and foreign trade were liberalized, 
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and public services and companies were privatized, with the important exception of copper.”81 
The government was left out of social redistribution, as this was thought to occur as a 
consequence of trickle-down effects. This hands-off approach translated into important decreases 
in public spending, and the dismantling of “earlier attempts to construct a welfare state.”82 Social 
institutions such as health care and education were also affected, as citizens started to be 
perceived as clients and consumers. The result was the depoliticization of traditional public 
policy sectors. This degree of decentralization is not compatible with a broad definition of 
democracy, suggesting that neoliberalism in its orthodox form could have not been established 
outside of the context prevailing in Chile at the time. In other words, “there would have been no 
economic miracle without an authoritarian regime because dismantling the welfare state could 
not have been accomplished without the violent silencing of the political opposition.”83 In a 
democratic setting, there is a collective decision to be made on what interests other than those 
maximized by the market should be protected and promoted. This, would “not only be 
economically inefficient but also morally unjust” from a neoliberal standpoint.84 Economically, 
state intervention corrupts the efficient allocation of resources of the market; and, morally, “the 
democratic principle of majority rule is unjust to the extent that it infringes upon or usurps the 
rights, particularly property rights, of private individuals.”85  
This incompatibility between orthodox neoliberalism and democracy meant that when 
Chile transitioned to a democratic government, the economic model had to be redefined. Chile’s 
pursuit of a model which could combine free markets with democracy “required a set of cultural 
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practices that could disassociate capitalism from authoritarianism and locate free markets within 
political democracy.”86 Yet, the abandonment of rigid neoliberal theory began during the 
dictatorship, primarily due to public unrest. “Thus, to some extent, orthodox neoliberalism was 
deemed a failure in Chile as early as the beginning of the 1980s.”87  
 
Figure 2: Chile’s GDP (in billions of USD) 88 
 
 
As it can be observed in Figure 2, the abandonment of orthodox neoliberalism in the early 
1980s is correlated with Chile’s impressive GDP growth which has been sustained and further 
improved after the transition until the present moment. This ‘Chilean miracle’ explains why 
neoliberalism has gone unquestioned by the Concertación governments post-1990. Even if 
current Chilean political parties show many points of continuity with those that existed prior to 
the coup in 1973, “today’s center-left practices have abandoned goals and practices that they 
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believe contributed to the breakdown of democracy.”89 Parties such as the PDC and the PS which 
showed ideological rigidity before the dictatorship have now adopted a more flexible approach to 
the way they conduct politics. This willingness to compromise is exemplified by the Party for 
Democracy (PPD) which was created at the time of the plebiscite to unify opposition to 
Pinochet.90 In fact, in January of this year, Senators Ricardo Lagos Weber and Felipe Harboe 
presented a proposal to the PPD titled “Collective Reflections About the Future of the PPD.”91 
With this document, Lagos and Harboe sought to call attention to the need of the PPD to redefine 
its ideology and renew its principles. The preoccupation expressed by Lagos Weber and Harboe 
portrays the way in which political parties in Chile in general have chosen to sacrifice their 
ideological rigidity in exchange for political stability. However, this has also affected party 
identification within the Chilean population.  
A second important byproduct of the neoliberalist model has been economic inequality. 
Although “Chile’s pattern of very unequal income distribution predates neoliberal restructuring, 
it was intensified by structural adjustment measures and the speed of increases in earnings of the 
top 1 percent of the population.”92 Informal norms that prioritize economic growth over 
redistribution also had the effect of establishing an alliance between the state and business, 
“privileging the voice of Chile’s capitalist class over economic decisions.”93 Yet, even if Chile 
remains as the most unequal country within the OECD, its inequality levels are being reduced - 
as indicated by a time-series of Chile’s Gini coefficient in Figure 3 - portraying the success of 
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the Concertación governments in maintaining high levels of economic growth and diminishing 
inequality.  
Figure 3: Chile’s Gini coefficient94 
 
 
 
What did change in 1990 was the idea that instead of being seen as a way of avoiding social 
unrest, reduction of poverty started to be seen as something ethical. Here, it is relevant to point 
out that this idea is related to one of the characteristics of the NPC; that is, the joining of market 
liberalism and social progressiveness.  
The situation in Chile fits what Julia Paley calls the “marketing of democracy.”95 Just as 
it exemplifies the Chilean model, this concept is applicable to other contemporary democracies. 
Globalization’s unprecedented intensity has increasingly deviated policy decisions into the 
prioritization of export models of development and into increasing the rate of imports and 
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foreign investment. But, as Paley suggests, “sustaining this model requires political stability,96 
which would account for Chile’s quest for this political goal and thus the moderation of social 
movement activity.  
 
A Political Culture of Order and Stability  
 
The years of the dictatorship were marked by repression against political parties, labor 
unions, and students. General Pinochet envisioned a model for Chile based on “order and 
progress in which the shrill, destructive clash of ideologies and partisan rivalries would be 
replaced by harmonious, vertical relations among individuals, civic groups, and the state.”97 The 
means to achieve this order and stability, however, were oppressive and violent. The year 1974, 
for example, marked the creation of the DINA which, by decree, was assigned the power to 
“produce the intelligence necessary to formulate policies and planning, and to adopt measures to 
procure the safeguarding of National Security and development of the country.”98 The DINA was 
also secretly given the power to arrest subjects and to demand collaboration from all public 
agencies.99 In an effort to create a political culture that valued order and respect for authority, the 
DINA and the junta at large worked to eradicate political ideologies that did not match the one 
held by the dictator. The intimidating power the DINA exerted “reached beyond victims and 
their families, into the roots of society itself.”100 The result was that in addition to political 
stability, the junta was instrumental in the creation of a society led by mistrust. In order to 
protect themselves from punishment, Chileans had to watch out for their colleagues, neighbors, 
and even their friends, who could have secretly been working as spies or informants. In fact, 
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human rights were seen by the junta as “a synonym for Marxist propaganda [...] and the few 
prominent individuals who spoke out against repression were shunned.”101 
Since Pinochet’s dictatorship was perceived by a prominent part of the population as the 
necessary evil to rectify the instability that existed in the early 1970s, when Chile transitioned to 
democratic rule there emerged a fear of political polarization or destabilization that became seen 
as opposing political order and stability. This desire not to ever return to the Pinochet years 
meant that harmony and cooperation have also been sought during democratic times. And, even 
if it is logical for politicians to want a peaceful state of affairs, in Chile this quest for stability has 
sometimes meant an impediment to the deepening of democracy. This is because the leaders of 
the Concertación reasoned that “democratic stability could only be assured by depoliticizing state 
and society.”102 Julia Paley’s work on La Bandera - a lower class neighborhood in the south of 
Santiago - portrays the way in which mass mobilization and engagement with politics started 
waning after 1990. During her time at La Bandera, Paley got to experience the pouring of people 
into the street after four relatively quiet years, along with “the lighting of tires, the blocking off 
traffic, [and] the battle with police.”103 Paley explains that “the event showed that even after the 
political transition, residents of La Bandera had retained the capacity for massive action, the 
cultural practices of ritualized expression, and the collective memory of what it meant to 
mobilize.”104 Yet, the reason these people were going to the streets was not even remotely related 
to the political; it was “a celebration of the Chilean soccer team’s victory in the Latin American 
championship.”105 Not only were these instances of public mobilization rare, but for a 
considerable period of time after the dictatorial years, when they occurred, they were about 
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depoliticized issues. In fact, Paley interviewed some of the people living at La Bandera to 
discover a yearning for the years of the dictatorship, as these were recalled “as a time when the 
link between the government and the economic model was evident, and when the political goal - 
overthrowing the dictatorship - was clear.”106 With the new Concertación governments there was 
a growing sense of feeling “abandoned by political parties, disconnected from broader social 
movements, and isolated from their neighbors.”107 
The choice made by the Concertación governments to prioritize stability over ideological 
expression and rigidity led to the weakening of the center-left parties in comparison to the pre-
coup years. And, in fact, the electoral exclusion of the far left and the pursuit of consensus did 
have the desired effect of preserving high levels of order and stability. However, this has resulted 
in a trade-off with “a more representative and responsive form of politics,” leading in turn to 
“disenchantment with political parties and other democratic institutions and a significant decline 
in political participation.”108 Contrary to mainstream perception, Dahl has established that 
“democratic systems are more inherently stable than autocratic systems.”109 The simple 
explanation behind this argument is that “democratic states allow for citizens to contest the state 
within the rule of law, allowing a safety valve upon which citizens can show dissatisfaction or 
resentment against state policies without actively destabilizing or overthrowing the state.”110 One 
of the ways in which citizens can do this, is through elections, where “they can openly influence 
political outcomes without resorting to subversive acts.”111 But, in Chile, voter turnout has been 
on decrease since the day of the 1988 plebiscite, suggesting that Chilean disengagement has not 
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only been shown by their absence in the streets but also by their lack of participation at the ballot 
boxes.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE CHILEAN CRISIS OF REPRESENTATION 
 
The Link between Representation and Participation  
 
In an interview with Jonathan Bernstein - a Bloomberg journalist and political scientist - 
Kristina Mani asserted that “since returning to democracy in 1990 [...] Chile is one of the 
hemisphere’s most stable democracies - it as strong institutions and established political parties, 
as well as constitutional rules that set a high bar against dramatic changes in policy.”112 Mani 
explained that “stability like that is good in a low of ways, because it forces politicians to try to 
achieve compromises and consensus positions on policies.”113 But at the same time, it can 
alienate the public, “for instance when political leaders make campaign promises they can’t keep 
later, or when the same folks keep surfacing as the main candidates - and right now we’re seeing 
exactly that kind of voter frustration.”114 In Chile, the same coalition and last names appear 
systematically during elections, and the 2017 elections were no exception. Sebastián Piñera’s 
victory means that - if he normally completes his four year term - the same two candidates would 
have governed the country for sixteen years. And, even before that, there were sixteen other 
years were the candidates belonged uniquely to the Concertación. As highlighted by Table 3, 
when looking at the elections since 1990, the last names that appeared on each election are 
largely repetitive. And, although coalitions have been reorganized in different years and some 
new parties have emerged, their values have not radically varied.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
112 Jonathan Bernstein, “Chile’s Democracy Enters a Rough Patch,” Bloomberg, Nov. 18, 2017. 
113 Ibid.  
114 Bernstein, “Chile’s Democracy Enters a Rough Patch.” 
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Table 3: Candidates by Election115  
 
Election 
Year 
Candidate Party/Coalition 
1989 Patricio Aylwin Azócar Christian Democratic Party (PDC)/Concertación 
 Hernán Büchi Buc Independent 
 Francisco Javier Errázuriz Talavera Independent  
1993 Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle Christian Democratic Party (PDC)/Concertación 
 Arturo Alessandri Besa Independent 
 José  Piñera Independent 
 Manfred Max Neef Independent 
 Eugenio Pizarro Independent 
 Cristian Reitze Humanist Green Alliance 
1999 Ricardo Lagos PDC/Concertación 
 Joaquín Lavín Independent Democratic Union (UDI)/Alliance for Chile 
 Gladys Marín Communist Party 
 Tomás Hirsch Goldschmmidt Humanist Party 
 Sara Larraín Independent 
 Arturo Frei Bolívar Union of the Centrist Center (UCC) 
2005 Michelle Bachelet Socialist Party/Concertación 
 Sebastián Piñera Echenique Renovación Nacional (RN)/Alliance for Chile 
 Joaquín Lavín Infante UDI/Alliance for Chile 
 Tomás Hirsch Goldschmidt Humanist Party 
2009 Sebastián Piñera Echenique RN/Alliance for Chile 
 Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle PDC/Concertación 
 Marco Enríquez-Ominami Gumucio Independent 
 Jorge Arrate Mac Niven Communist Party 
2013 Michelle Bachelet Socialist Party/Nueva Mayoría 
 Evelyn Matthei  UDI/Alliance for Chile 
 Marco Enríquez-Ominami Gumucio Partido Progresista (PRO)/Si tú quieres, Chile cambia 
 Franco Parisi Fernández Independent 
 Marcel Claude Reyes Humanist Party/Todos a La Moneda 
 Alfredo Sfeir Younis Ecologist Party (ECOV) 
 Roxana Miranda Meneses  Equal Party (IGUAL) 
 Ricardo Israel Zipper Independent Regionalist Party (PRI) 
 Tomás Jocelyn-Holt Letelier Independent 
2017 Carolina Goic PDC 
 José Antonio Kast Independent 
 Sebastián Piñera RN/Chile Vamos 
 Alejandro Guillier Independent  
 Beatriz Sánchez Independent/Broad Front (FA) 
 Marco Enríquez-Ominai Progressive Party 
 Eduardo Artés Patriotic Union Party 
 Alejandro Navarro Country Party  
 
                                                
115 Constructed by the author, based on data from El Mercurio and Diario 24 Horas.  
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The Concertación dominated the two decades after the transition to democracy, only to 
see a resurgence of the right in 2009 with the victory of Piñera under the Alliance for Chile. 
Bachelet made a second appearance in 2013 but this time under the coalition the New Majority. 
Although the parties of the center-left claimed the renaming of the coalition represented the 
revision and renovation of the coalition’s objectives, it was more of a continuation of the values 
of the Concertación. In a similar way, Piñera was re-elected president in 2017 under Chile 
Vamos (Go Chile), the new name for the Alliance.  
This stability and candidate consistency in the Chilean political system is reflected in the 
party volatility. The results for Chile’s Pedersen Index across time are summarized in Table 4.  
 
Table 4: Chile’s Pedersen Index by Election 
 
 
Despite the limitations of the Pedersen Index when applied to the Chilean case as discussed by 
Juan Pablo Luna and David Atman in 2011,116 the results are still useful to highlight Chile’s 
stable and regular party competition patterns. In general terms, it would be expected that if there 
is a high degree of party polarization in a given country for voting patterns to become stable (as 
it is the case in two-party systems, for instance). But multi-party Chile, still reflects this stable 
voter behavior. Although on one side this political stability is a sign of a healthy democracy, in 
the case of Chile it still reflects the fact that parties have remained virtually the same across time. 
                                                
116 Juan Pablo Luna and David Altman, “Uprooted but Stable: Chilean Parties and the Concept of Party System 
Institutionalization,” Latin American Politics and Society 53, no. 2 (2011).  
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This situation would not be problematic if the parties were representing the demands of the 
voting population. However, the low degrees of voter turnout in Chile suggest that this is not 
necessarily the case.  
In the November 2017 presidential elections, Chile hit a new record low voter turnout. 
According to the Chilean newspaper La Tercera only 46.7 percent of the Chilean voting 
population attended the polls.117 Although there was a ten percent increase in voter turnout 
during the second round, the results are part of a downward trend in participation since the 1988 
plebiscite, where about 87 percent of the population voted. 
 
Figure 4: Voter Turnout in Chile (1989-2017) 118 
 
 
                                                
117 Antonio Díaz and Cristóbal Huneeus, “Big Data Electoral: ¿Qué pasó con la participación el 2017? Una mirada a 
la primera vuelta,” La Tercera, Dec. 14, 2017. 
118 Constructed by the author, based on data from PNUD, INE, and Diario 24 Horas. 
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Despite this negative trend in engagement at the national level, it is important to 
acknowledge some significant increases in participation recorded when different comunas are 
analyzed separately. District 11, for example, includes the comunas of Las Condes, Vitacura, Lo 
Barnechea, La Reina y Peñalolén; that is, the richest neighborhoods in Chile. An increase in 
voter turnout for District 11 can be safely attributed to the candidacy of Piñera, a businessman 
who is closely linked to the economic elite. However, there was also an increase in participation 
in District 2, which contains the neighborhoods of Alto Hospicio, Camiña, Colchane, Huara, 
Pica, Iquique, and Pozo Almonte, poorer Chilean comunas. An explanation for the rise in voter 
turnout in these areas could be an increase in competition during this election. As depicted in 
Table 3, the amount of candidates for the 2017 elections was the second highest since the return 
to democracy. The fact that in 2013 there was even one more candidate as an option and voter 
turnout was lower suggests that competition may not be the only factor affecting the rise in 
participation. At the same time, the commune with the lowest voter turnout - District 18 - was 
one in which there was heightened competition at the municipal level too.119 In fact, experts 
assure that the economic group to which a person belongs has had relevant effects on voter 
turnout in Chile. A person who lives in Las Condes or Vitacura is two times more likely to vote 
than a person from La Pintana120, which - along with the comunas of the second district - also 
represents a poor neighborhood.  
Another phenomenon observed during this election is one that has been relevant during 
the previous elections as well; that is, voters change their voting district not only from election to 
election, but even from round to round in a hopeless search to find a candidate that represents 
                                                
119 Díaz and Huneeus, “Big Data Electoral: ¿Qué pasó con la participación el 2017? Una mirada a la primera 
vuelta.” 
120 “Participación electoral baja respecto a la presidencial 2013,” 24 Horas (Santiago de Chile, Chile) Nov. 19, 
2017. 
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their political view and demands. The combination of political stability and low levels of citizen 
identification with Chilean political parties have resulted in a real problem of representation. 
This issue can also be seen in the rise of independent parties (i.e., outside the two dominating 
coalitions) since 2005. Although it would be expected to find a high amount of independent 
candidates during the first transition governments, the fact that candidates such as Enriquez-
Ominami are leaving the main coalitions and entering the polls with their independent parties 
highlights the increasing lack of identification with the two broad alliances.  
 
Figure 5: Party Identification121 
 
 
 
As it can be observed in Figure 7, since the year 2010 there has been a growing trend in 
the amount of Chileans that do not identify with any political party. This is alarming when 
considering that this increasing percentage represents more than half of the population. As Paul 
                                                
121 Constructed by the author, based on data from Latinobarómetro. 
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Posner has noticed, however, party identification in Chile does not stem from disinterest in 
politics.122 In fact, Posner conducted studies where he concluded that 92 percent of Chilean 
respondents could correctly situate political parties on an ideological spectrum, suggesting that 
“the Chilean does not reject politics without knowing about it; rather he rejects politics because 
he knows much about it and appreciates continuing to reject it, drawing arguments from the 
information in order to do so.”123 Instead, party identification in Chile is a result of the decline in 
the legitimacy of parties.  
The political culture created during the transition years has been critical in the creation of 
popular Chilean disengagement with politics. The favoring of consensus over the politicization 
of social issues means the disregard from part of Chilean politicians of the existence of sub-
political cultures. This was facilitated due to the power these elites have in dominating 
politically, economically, and socially. Yet, the loss of legitimacy in political parties at the mass 
levels translates into the destabilization of democracy at the mass level through the deterioration 
of the vertical ties between elites and the masses. The result in the long-run (e.g., almost three 
decades after the transition to democracy) is the opposite to what it was sought through 
pragmatism; that is, moderation, cooperation, bargaining, and accommodation. And, in order to 
reach this stability at the mass level, there is a need for institutional change.  
 
The Penguin Revolution 
 
The emergence of the student-led protests in Chile in 2006, which later intensified in 
2011, suggested that there was a re-politicization of certain social issues in the country. 
Bachelet’s reforms regarding the education system, in addition to her reforms on abortion laws 
                                                
122 Posner, State, Market, and Democracy in Chile, 84. 
123 Ibid.  
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and gay unions, her efforts to transform labor unions, and the inauguration of new public 
transportation routes also illustrate the way in Chile social issues have risen in salience relative 
to fiscal or economic programs, resembling one of the key characteristics of the NPC.  
La Marcha Pingüina (The Penguin Revolution) - as these student protests have been 
denominated - began in 2006 in Lota, a comuna located in the region of Concepción, which 
represents the second largest metropolitan region in Chile after Santiago. In April of that year, 
the students of the school A-45 Carlos Cousiño started a strike due to their institution’s dreadful 
infrastructure.124 There had been videos of this school going viral portraying its flooded hallways 
and thus receiving the nickname of the “liceo acuático” (aquatic school).125 What occurred in A-
45 Carlos Cousiño, however, was representative of most municipal schools, which received 
insufficient financial support to maintain proper infrastructure. A month after the first strike in 
Lota, more than half of the schools in Chile were in strike, receiving support from the Asamblea 
Coordinadora de Estudiantes Secundarios (ACES, Coordinating Assembly of Grade School 
Students) and being joined by subsidized and private institutions as well.126 The slogan was “No 
a la LOCE” (No to the LOCE), an educational law established by Pinochet during his last year in 
office, dictating minimum requirements to be met by all Chilean institutions. The main criticism 
coming from students was that through its prioritization of educational liberties, the Ley 
Orgánica Constitucional de Enseñanza (Organic Constitutional Law on Education) jeopardized 
educational quality.127  
Apart from representing a challenge to the neoliberal values established during the 
dictatorial period, the first Penguin Revolution also symbolized a recognition from part of young 
                                                
124 Felipe Ramírez, “2006-2016: Las transformaciones en la escena educacional chilena,” Universidad de Chile 
(Santiago de Chile, Chile), May 19, 2016. 
125 Ibid.  
126 Ibid.  
127 “Preguntas y respuestas, aspectos clave sobre la LOCE,” El Mercurio (Santiago de Chile, Chile), Jun., 5, 2006. 
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and educated Chileans that their basic social interests were being disregarded not because of 
incompetency from part of the first Bachelet administration, but as a consequence of the Chilean 
model per se.128 This meant that students had the capacity of joining together a widespread social 
demand based on the unmet promise of social mobility, something Victor Orellana - member of 
the Centro de Investigación Avanzada en Educación (CIAE, Center for Advanced Research in 
Education) - considers as a questioning of the political regime as a whole.129  
In this way, the Penguin Revolution marks the culminating point when the culture of 
stability and consensus became inadequate in the eyes of the Chilean masses. The student-led 
protests also reflect a dynamism in Chilean political culture in the way that they have departed 
from the demands of the 1970s to resemble the advanced democracies’ NPC. Not only have 
these demands engaged younger and more educated actors (point 7), but they have also 
illustrated an explicit distinction between social and economic issues (point 1 and 3), portrayed 
the way in which market liberalism and social progressiveness can be complemented (point 4), 
questioned the efficiency of the welfare state (point 5), and broadened citizen participation (point 
7). Perhaps most importantly, the Penguin Revolution portrayed the overcoming the pragmatic 
political culture established during the transition to democracy valuing moderation, cooperation, 
bargaining, and accommodation, and thus defied the traditional left-right cleavage (point 1). 
While previously it was popularly considered that criticizing the Concertación meant siding with 
the political right, the student-led protests represented the criticism of the Chilean model during 
the Bachelet government.130 The 2006 strikes culminated in the Ley General de Educación 
(LGE, General Education Law). The LGE derogated the LOCE and included the principles of 
educational universalism, educational quality, equity, autonomy, diversity, responsibility, 
                                                
128 Ramírez, “2006-2016: Las transformaciones en la escena educacional chilena.” 
129 Ibid.  
130 Ibid.  
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participation, flexibility, transparency, integration, sustainability, and interculturality131, and thus 
represented a success for the student community. Yet, students were not satisfied with the 
achievement and stroke again in 2011. As acknowledged by Diamond, “all democracies require 
periodic institutional renewal,”132 and this movement in Chile to a NPC as conceptualized by the 
Penguin Revolution suggests that perhaps it is the time that Chile goes through deep adjustment. 
The next step is that political elites prove responsive. Yet, the victory of Piñera under the right-
wing coalition Chile Vamos in 2017 once again points out to a deviation from a social agenda. 
Although it is still too early on his second term to make a definitive conclusion, Piñera has 
entered his second term with a more reformist agenda in comparison to his first term in office. 
Piñera’s re-election, however, highlights the Chilean elite political culture which prioritizes 
stability over change, considering that the people who attend the polls are also the ones living in 
the richer comunas (refer to previous section). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
131 “Ley General de Educación,” Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile (Santiago de Chile, Chile), Apr. 25, 
2013. 
132 Diamond, Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries, 432. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
Although the current democratic outlook in Latin America is generally positive - with the 
clear exception of Venezuela - there is an apparent problem of representation which has most 
prominently affected the Andean countries, such as Chile. Chile and its South American 
counterparts are dealing with problems of representative democracy unprecedented in the region. 
This has led to a re-definition of what representation and participation entail. In Chile, after 
Pinochet was ousted, the state was maintained relatively intact. Although the 1980 Constitution 
has been amended several times in an attempt to eliminate authoritarian enclaves, the 1990s were 
critical in the creation of a political culture that values political pragmatism and stability over the 
politicization of social issues.  
The analysis of the Chilean case yields the conclusion that more than a democratic crisis - 
as established by Abramowitz - the problem of representation and participation is a systemic and 
systematic issue. Although historically cooperation has been crucial to balance cleavage conflict 
with a need for cooperation, this goal can be achieved through the improvement of vertical ties 
between political elites and the masses, which would then decrease the risk of loss of 
identification with political parties when they relax their ideological positions. The Penguin 
Revolution demonstrate the way that instead of an incompetency from the part of Bachelet as it 
was originally described, mass discontent stems from inefficiencies in the Chilean model. The 
political culture which developed during the democratic transition within the political elite and 
which established political pragmatism and cohesion as main goals, led to a loss in democratic 
legitimacy at the mass level as basic social reforms failed to take place. The student-led protests 
thus represent an opportunity for Chile to continue working on institutional and structural 
innovation if it seeks to deepen the quality of its democracy.  
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